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Abstract—Recurrent neural networks (RNNs) have been ap-
plied to a broad range of application areas such as natural
language processing, drug discovery, and video recognition. This
paper develops a coverage-guided test framework, including three
test metrics and a mutation-based test case generation method,
for the validation of a major class of RNNs, i.e., long short-
term memory networks (LSTMs). The test metrics are designed
with respect to the internal structures of the LSTM layers,
to quantify the information of the forget gate, the one-step
information change of an aggregate hidden state, and the multi-
step information evolution of positive and negative aggregate
hidden state, respectively. We apply the test framework to several
typical LSTM applications, including a network trained on IMDB
movie reviews for sentiment analysis, a network trained on
MNIST dataset for image classification, and a network trained
on a lipophilicity dataset for scientific machine learning. Our
experimental results show that the coverage-guided testing can
be used to not only extensively exploit the behaviour of the LSTM
layer in order to discover the safety loopholes (such as adversarial
examples) but also help understand the internal mechanism of
how the LSTM layer processes data.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recurrent neural networks (RNNs) have been widely used in
many application areas such as automated language translation
[45], robotic control [42], drug discovery [36], automatic
speech recognition [19], time series prediction [33], etc. Most
efforts for developing RNNs have been spent on improving
empirical accuracy and reducing empirical generalisation error,
and less work has been done towards their verification and
validation. Verification and validation (V&V) are independent
procedures that are used together for checking that a prod-
uct, service, or system meets requirements and specifications
and that it fulfills its intended purpose [2]. Unlike software
systems which are programmed based on their specifications,
a learning system is obtained by learning from a set of data
samples. That is, the specification of a learning system is less
explicit. While research has started to discuss how to establish
specifications for learning systems [5], this paper is moving
towards developing techniques to validate RNNs against their
specifications. More specifically, we focus on a major class of
RNNs, i.e., long short-term memory networks (LSTMs) and
an important specification.
The specification to be considered is the robustness, which
requires that a prediction made by a learning system is invari-
ant with respect to small perturbations on the input. It has been
shown that robustness may be at odd with accuracy [40], which
suggests that, in addition to improving the empirical accuracy,
efforts are needed to check, and improve, the robustness of
learning systems. Since the discovery of adversarial examples
in deep feedforward neural networks (FNNs), particularly
convolutional neural networks (CNNs) for image classifica-
Fig. 1. Adversarial examples for LSTM models trained on MNIST hand-
written digits dataset for image classification, an IMDB reviews dataset for
sentiment analysis, and a SMILES strings dataset for lipophilicity prediction,
respectively.
tion [39], the robustness of neural networks has been been
intensively studied from several aspects including e.g., attack
methods [7], defence methods [28], verification methods [24],
[21], [16], and testing methods [32], [38], [26], etc. However,
the research on the verification and validation methods for
RNNs are sparse, if there is any, due to the challenging facts
that (1) verification and testing methods are usually white-box,
which requires the access to internal structures of a network,
(2) the internal structures of RNNs are much more complicated
than CNNs, with some continuous structures such as sigmoid
and tanh cannot be directly handled with existing verification
methods such as SMT-based methods [24] and its iterative
nature easily leads to the scalability problem for search-based
methods [21] and abstract interpretation based methods [16],
and (3) existing deep learning platforms such as Tensorflow
do not support a direct, easy access to the internal structures
of LSTM layers. Nevertheless, the verification and validation
of RNNs are needed, see Figure 1 for a few typical adversarial
examples (the faults with respect to the robustness) for LSTM
networks used in our experiments.
Our approach is based on the coverage-guided testing [47],
which has been shown successful in software fault detection.
Coverage-guided testing has been extended to work with FNNs
in recent work such as [32], [44], [26], [37], [38], [25], where a
collection of test metrics and test case generation algorithms
are proposed. These metrics are based on the structural in-
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formation of the FNNs, such as the neurons [32], [26], the
relation between neurons in neighboring layers [37], [38], etc.
By generating a set of test conditions and a set of test cases,
a coverage-guided testing exploits the behaviour of network
by claiming that a certain percentage of test conditions are
asserted or satisfied by the test cases. When working with
RNNs whose internal structures are much more involved, new
test metrics and new test case generation methods are needed
to take into account the additional structures and complexity.
We develop three test metrics and a generic mutation-based
test case generation method. The test metrics are designed
to exploit different functional components of the LSTM net-
works, by considering both the one-step information change
and the multi-step information evolution, and both the gate
vectors and the hidden state vectors. Gate and hidden state are
internal structural components of an LSTM cell. Specifically,
we quantify the filtering ability of forget gates with gate cover-
age (GC), the one-step change of aggregated hidden states with
cell coverage (CC), and the multi-step evolution of positive
or negative hidden states with sequence coverage (SC). For
test case generation, we iteratively apply a set of mutation
operations on seed inputs. When a gradient of the network loss
function with respect to the input is obtainable (for continuous
inputs such as images), we design a set of mutation operations
based on the gradient direction. On the other hand, when a
gradient is not obtainable (for discrete inputs such as words),
we use user-specified mutation operations.
In [], the effectiveness of structural coverage guided testing
is questioned. The authors mentioned a few aspects, including
the structural coverage can be too loose, the test case genera-
tion is dependent on the adversarial attacking algorithm, and
there is a lack of correlation between misclassified inputs in
a test set and its structural coverage.
We develop a tool testRNN1 and conduct an extensive set
of experiments on three LSTM networks, trained on an IMDB
review dataset, the MNIST image dataset, and a lipophilicity
(a physicochemical property of drugs) dataset, respectively.
Two of them have a single LSTM layer and the other has two
connected LSTM layers. The experimental results show that,
(1) our test framework is effective, in terms of its efficiency in
generating test cases, its (non-trivial) possibility in achieving
high coverage, and its ability in discovering faults, (2) the
test metrics are complementary to each other in guiding the
generation of test cases, i.e., the test cases generated by one
test metric cannot be applied to achieve high coverage of the
other metrics, and (3) the generated test cases can be utilised
to understand the working principle of the LSTM networks.
II. PRELIMINARIES
Feedforward neural networks (FNNs) can be represented as
a function φ : X → Y , mapping from input domain X to
output domain Y , and is usually used to perform predictions
based on an input x ∈ X , or recognise patterns in x. For a
sequence of inputs x1, ..., xn, φ will handle them individually
1Available via https://github.com/TrustAI/testRNN
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Fig. 2. A simple recurrent layer
without considering results from previous predictions, that is,
the result of φ(xi) is independent of the results of φ(xj) when
j 6= i.
By contrast, a recurrent neural network (RNN) is used to
work with sequential data. Usually, an RNN contains at least
one recurrent layer. Figure 2 illustrates how a sequential input
is handled by a recurrent layer by unfolding. A recurrent layer
can be represented as a function ψ : X ′ ×C × Y ′ → C × Y ′
such that ψ(xt, ct−1, ht−1) = (ct, ht) for t = 1...n, where
ct is the cell state and acts as the intermediate memory, and
t denotes the t-th time step. Intuitively, the recurrent layer
takes as inputs the current time input xt, the previous time
memory state ct−1 and the previous time output ht−1, updates
the memory state into ct, and returns ht as the current time
output. Initially, we let c0 and h0 be 0-valued vectors. For a
(finite) sequence of inputs x1, ..., xn, this function ψ is applied
recursively on them. For example, the popular long short-term
memory (LSTM) layer can be represented with the following
equations for time t:
ft = σ(Wf · [ht−1, xt] + bf )
it = σ(Wi · [ht−1, xt] + bi)
ct = ft ∗ ct−1 + it ∗ tanh(Wc · [ht−1, xt] + bc)
ot = σ(Wo · [ht−1, xt] + bo)
ht = ot ∗ tanh(ct)
(1)
where σ is the sigmoid function such that σ(x) ∈ [0, 1]
for any x ∈ R, tanh is the hyperbolic tangent function such
that tanh(x) ∈ [−1, 1] for any x ∈ R, Wf ,Wi,Wc,Wo are
weight matrices, bf , bi, bc, bo are bias vectors, ft, it, ot are
internal gate variables, ht is the hidden state variable (utilising
ot), and ct is the cell state variable. For the connection with
successive layers, we only take the last output hn as the output.
For simplicity, when working with finite sequential data, we
can also define a recurrent layer as ψ : (X ′)n → Y ′, which
takes, as input, a sequential data of length n and returns the
last output hn. Normally, the recurrent layer is connected to
non-RNN layers such as fully connected layers so that the
output hn is processed further. We let the remaining layer be
a function φ2 : Y ′ → Y . Moreover, there can be feedforward
layers connecting to the RNN layer, and we let it be a function
φ1 : X → X ′. Then given a sequential input x1, ..., xn, the
RNN is a function ϕ such that
ϕ(x1...xn) = φ2 · ψ(
n∏
i=1
φ1(xi)) (2)
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In general, an RNN is a function ϕ : Xn → Y which takes,
as input, a sequence x1, ..., xn. Inputs xi are processed in
parallel with the function φ1, with the results being processed
within the RNN layer ψ. The result from the RNN layer is
then processed further with function φ2 to provide the final
output. While the function ϕ is for networks with a single
RNN layer, it can be easily extended to networks with multiple
RNN layers.
Deep (recurrent) neural networks, ϕ, consist of multiple
layers, and we write Lk for the k-th layer. We write Nk =
{nk,i | 1 ≤ i ≤ sk} for the set of variables (or neurons) of
layer Lk, where nk,i is the i-th variable among the sk number
of variables at layer Lk.
III. INTERNAL INFORMATION OF LSTM CELLS
In this part, we first formulate two types of internal in-
formation of LSTMs that will be used later to define our
coverage criteria. For an LSTM network, there are a sequence
of inputs x = {xt}nt=1, gate values f = {ft}nt=0, i = {it}nt=0,
o = {ot}nt=0, and hidden states h = {ht}nt=0, where each
element xt, ft, it, ot, ht is a vector of real numbers. We use
variable v to range over {x, f, i, o, h}, use vt to denote the
value of v at time t, and write vt(k) to denote the k-
th component of vt. Moreover, for either v or vt where
v ∈ {f, i, o, h}, we may use a subscript x, written as e.g.,
vx, vx,t, etc., when it is needed to refer to its corresponding
input x.
In the following, we consider abstract information from the
internal structure, i.e., hidden state vectors and gate vectors,
of an LSTM cell, and present their intuitive meanings. These
information will be used to design test metrics in Section IV.
a) Aggregate information of hidden states: According to
Equation (1), the component value of ht varies between -1 and
1. It is therefore reasonable to divide the possible information
of a component ht(k) into positive (> 0) and negative (< 0).
For ht, we take the aggregate information [29] ξt = (ξ+t , ξ
−
t ),
by summing up positive component values and negative ones,
respectively, such that
ξ+t =
∑
{ht(i) | i ∈ {1, . . . , |ht|}, ht(i) > 0}
ξ−t =
∑
{ht(i) | i ∈ {1, . . . , |ht|}, ht(i) < 0}
(3)
Intuitively, ξ+t represents the extent to which the hidden state
ht contains positive information and ξ−t represents the extent
to which the hidden state ht contains negative information. In
the following, we show how ξt can be utilised to provide intu-
ition into the processing of inputs by LSTM layer. Basically,
we consider both a one-step change and a multi-step change
on information based on ξ1, . . . , ξn.
Consider a sentiment analysis example, where an LSTM
network is trained to classify the sentiment (positive or nega-
tive) of movie reviews. As shown in Figure 3, assume that
the input is e.g., “horrible movie and really bad watching
experience”, “I really liked the movie and had fun”, etc., we
consider the following quantity
∆ξt = |ξ+t − ξ+t−1|+ |ξ−t − ξ−t−1| (4)
Fig. 3. Four examples to show how positive and negative elements of hidden
state vectors represent the information in MNIST and IMDB models. The
x-axis includes the inputs (bottom row) and the y-axis includes ξ+t (top row),
ξ−t (second row) and ∆ξt (third row) values.
which compares the information of the current step ξt with
its previous step ξt−1. Intuitively, ∆ξt is the abstract repre-
sentation of information updated between hidden states. From
the bar charts in the third row of Figure 3, we can see that
sensitive words such as “like”,“horrible”,“fun” trigger greater
∆ξt values than non-sensitive words such as “movie”, “really”,
and “had”. Also, for MNIST images where the t-th column
is processed as the cell input xt, more informative columns
such as the 9th and 10th columns of both the digit “2” and
“3” trigger greater ∆ξt values than the first and last columns.
We can track the change of ξ+t and ξ
−
t for a certain time
span. Figure 3 presents two curves for each input. The one in
the top row is for ξ+t and in the second row is for ξ
−
t .
b) Abstract information of gates: We now consider infor-
mation represented in the gates f , i, and o. In the LSTM, these
gates have their intuitive meanings. For example, the forget
gate f is to control the portion of information that should
pass through the gate, the input gate i determines how much
information will be added to the cell state, and the output gate
o determines which part of the cell state to output.
Definition 1: Let fx,t be the value of the gate f at time t
when the input is x. We use remember rate Rt(f, x) to denote
the portion of information passing through the gate f at time
t that can be remembered, given the input is x. Formally, we
have
Rt(f, x) =
1
|fx,t|
|fx,t|∑
i=1
fx,t(i). (5)
It is easy to see that Rt(f, x) is within the range [0, 1], since
all components in fx,t have their values bounded in [0, 1].
IV. TEST METRICS FOR LSTM
Existing test coverage metrics work for neural networks
[32], [26], [37], [38], [44], [25] focuses on feedforward
structures such as convolutional layer, fully connected layer,
maxpooling layer, etc. In this paper, we propose a set of
structural coverage metrics to work with LSTM layers and
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sequential inputs, by considering the internal information of
the cells as discussed in Section III.
Let R be a set of sets of test conditions, A a set of assert
methods, and T a set of test suites. A test coverage metric on a
network N is a function MN : R×A×T→ [0, 1]. Intuitively,
MN (R,A, T ) quantifies the degree of adequacy to which a
DNN N is tested by a test suite T with respect to a set R of
test conditions and an assert method A. Usually, the greater the
number MN (R,A, T ), the more adequate the testing. In this
section, we will develop the set R and for every R ∈ R their
corresponding assert method A and metric MN (R,A, T ). A
test suite T ∈ T contains a set of test cases, and we will
discuss in Section VI an algorithm we use in our experiments
to generate test suites.
A. Test Conditions
Every test condition is some functionality or behaviour of
the system we want to verify. In the following, we introduce
methods to define test conditions for LSTM networks.
a) Neuron Coverage: As a simple baseline, we extend
the idea of neuron coverage [32] to work with LSTM layers.
LetRNC be the set of test conditions, each of which represents
a hidden neuron under consideration. For LSTM layer, RNC
includes the component neurons in the last output hn, for
an input x of length n. Note that, RNC does not include
component neurons in any hi for i < n, since they are
intermediate results of LSTM and not obtainable by simply
observing the output of an LSTM layer.
Definition 2: Assume that we are working with the k-th
layer which is an LSTM layer. A neuron nk,i is asserted by a
test case x, denoted as ANC(nk,i, x), if hx,n(i) > 0. Recall
that, we use hx,n(i) to denote the i-th component of the hidden
state hn at the last time step n when given the input x, and
hx,n(i) ∈ [−1, 1].
As will be shown in the experiments in Section VIII,
the 100% neuron coverage (the concept of coverage will be
formally defined later in Section IV-B) can be easily achieved
with a small number of test cases. This makes neuron coverage
less powerful for testing, which aims to exploit the system with
a non-trivial number of test cases in order to expose incorrect
behaviour of a network. One reason for neuron coverage to
be less strong is that, it treats neurons as independent units,
without considering their collective behaviour. However, the
key strength of neural networks is its capability of extracting
features (which are usually represented with a set of neurons)
and based on this, combining a set of features to conduct high-
level tasks such as pattern recognition. It is not hard to see
that a feature in itself can be harder to be asserted by a set of
test cases than the neurons supporting it.
Instead of considering only the individual neurons, in the
following we design several test metrics for LSTM layers
that take into account the internal information of a vector
of neurons. In particular, the aggregate information of hidden
states and the abstract information of gates in Section III will
be used.
b) Gate Coverage: The first set of new test conditions is
designed to cover the behaviour of internal gates, i.e., f, i, o.
In this paper, we use the forget gate f as an example. The
behaviour of the forget gate at time t, i.e., ft, affects not only
the behaviour of the cell at time t locally but also the overall
behaviour of the LSTM layer. We let
RGC = {(ft, αf ) | t ∈ {1..n}}
be the set of test conditions, such that ft is the forget gate
value at time t and αf ∈ [0, 1] is a threshold value .
Definition 3: A test condition (ft, αf ) is asserted by a test
case x, denoted as AGC((ft, αf ), x), if Rt(f, x) > αf , i.e.,
the forget rate at time t is greater than the designated threshold
αf .
An important benefit for studying forget gate ft is on
understanding the cell state ct. According to Equation (1), ft
is used to directly control the information flowing from ct−1
to ct. However, because ct represents long-term memory, its
component values are not bounded, which makes the design of
test conditions harder to be fully automated, i.e., may have to
be problem specific. The other benefit is that, gate activation
statistics have been used to explain the internal mechanisms of
LSTM [23], and as will be discussed in the experiments, the
study of forget gates enables our understanding of the learning
process through a memorisation curve.
c) Cell Coverage: Cell is the basic working unit in
LSTM to deal with the information flow. According to Equa-
tion (1), in addition to the gates (forget gate ft and internal
gate it), the hidden state ht−1 is also a factor determining the
value of ct. The first sets of test conditions on hidden state ht is
based on quantifying the one-step change of the hidden output
∆ht, which is measured by the hidden aggregate information
change ∆ξt. Therefore, we let
RCC = {(∆ξt, αh) | t ∈ {1..n}}
be the set of test conditions, such that ∆ξt is the hidden
aggregate information change at time t and αh > 0 is a
threshold value.
Definition 4: A test condition (∆ξt, αh) is asserted by a test
case x, denoted as ACC((∆ξt, αh), x), if ∆ξx,t > αh. Recall
that, we use ∆ξx,t to refer to the value ∆ξt when the input is
x.
d) Sequence Coverage: As explained earlier, we are also
interested in checking, for an LSTM model, how information
updates in the time series. This complex task is essentially
a time series classification problem, and we can employ
symbolic representation method to provide a specific metric
to divide the hidden sequence patterns into several classes.
Our interest localizes on the sequence of positive hidden
information ξ+ and negative information ξ−.
Definition 5 (Symbolic Representation of Time Series): Let
D(ξ+) be the (possibly unbounded) range of values of the
quantity ξ+t . Given a finite set Γ of symbols, we split D(ξ
+)
into a set of sub-ranges
ΦΓ(D(ξ
+)) = {Di(ξ+) | i ∈ Γ},
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Fig. 4. A time series is transformed into symbolic representation with three
symbols Γ = {a, b, c}
such that D(ξ+) =
⋃
i∈ΓDi(ξ
+) and for all i, j ∈ Γ, i 6= j
implies that Di(ξ+) ∩ Di(ξ+) = ∅. Based on ΦΓ(D(ξ+)),
for any value of ξ+t , we associate it with a symbol i ∈ Γ
whenever ξ+t ∈ Di(ξ+). One step further, every sequence
ξ+ = ξ+1 ξ
+
2 ..ξ
+
n can be associated with a clause i1...in such
that ξ+j ∈ Dij (ξ+) for all j ∈ {1..n}.
While Definition 5 is for ξ+, it can be extended to work
with ξ−. Intuitively, it discretises the domain of the continuous
quantity ξ+t into a set of finite sub-ranges ΦΓ(D(ξ
+)), asso-
ciates each sub-range with a symbol in Γ, and then projects
each component of a time series into a symbol by matching
its value with a sub-range. By this process, a time series is
transformed into a sequence of symbols, or a clause.
Practically, the symbolic representations of time series are
obtained by the following steps, as illustrated intuitively in
Figure 4. First, a large amount of sequence data are sampled
to have their distribution. Second, a set of breakpoints are
determined by dividing the area under the curve into a set of
sub-areas of equal size volume. Every sub-area is associated
with a symbol. This step is to ensure that the appearance of
symbols has equal probability. Finally, a clause is generated
for each time series by replacing the vertices with symbols
corresponding to their respective sub-areas.
After getting the symbolic representation for time se-
quences, we can define test conditions. Given ΦΓ(D(ξ+)) and
a range [a, b] ⊆ [1..n], we let
R[a,b]SC = {⊥..⊥iaia+1...ib⊥...⊥ | ij ∈ Γ, j ∈ {a..b}} (6)
be a set of test conditions, where ⊥ is a special symbol
representing that the place is not within the range [a, b]. Given
a sequence s ∈ R[a,b]SC , we write s(i) for i ∈ {1..n} to denote
its i-th component.
Definition 6: Given a test case x and a test condition s ∈
R[a,b]SC , we say that s is asserted by x with positive information,
denoted as APSC(s, x), if for all j ∈ {1..n}, we have that
s(j) 6= ⊥ implies that ξ+j (x) ∈ Ds(j)(ξ+). Moreover, we say
that s is asserted by x with negative information, denoted as
ANSC(s, x), if for all j ∈ {1..n}, we have that s(j) 6= ⊥
implies that ξ−j (x) ∈ Ds(j)(ξ−).
Intuitively, sequence coverage is designed to test all possible
time series of either the positive information ξ+ or the negative
information ξ−.
B. Test Metrics
Let C = {NC,GC,CC,PSC,NSC}, R = {RC | C ∈ C}
and A = {AC | C ∈ C}, as defined in Section IV-A. Based
on them, we define a generic metric as follows.
Definition 7: Let C ∈ C and T a set of test cases. The test
coverage metric MN (RC ,AC , T ) for a network N is defined
as the percentage of the test conditions in RC asserted by the
test suite T with method AC . Formally,
MN (RC ,AC , T ) = |{∃x ∈ T : AC(r, x) | r ∈ RC}||RC | (7)
V. TEST ORACLE
Test oracle is usually employed to determine if a test passes
or fails. Test oracle automation is important to remove a
bottleneck that inhibits greater overall test automation [6]. For
our testing of LSTM networks, we employ a constraint (or
more broadly, a program) to determine whether a generated
test case passes the oracle or not. A test case does not pass the
test oracle suggests a potential safety loophole. It is usually for
the designer (or developer) of the LSTM network to determine
which constraint should be taken as the oracle, since the latter
relates to the correctness specification of the network under
design. In this paper, as an example to exhibit our test frame-
work (i.e., test metrics and test case generation algorithm),
we take the currently intensively-studied adversarial example
problem [39] to design our test oracle, and remark that the
test oracle in general is orthogonal to the test framework we
developed in this paper.
Practically, to work with adversarial examples, we define
a set of norm-balls, each of which is centered around a data
sample with known label. The radius αoracle of norm-balls
is given to intuitively mean that a human cannot differentiate
between inputs within a norm ball. In this paper, we consider
Euclidean distance || · ||2. We say that a test case x′ does not
pass the oracle if and only if (1) x′ is within the norm-ball of
some training sample x, i.e., ||x− x′||2 ≤ αoracle, and (2) x′
has a different classification from x, i.e., ϕ(x) 6= ϕ(x′).
VI. TEST CASE GENERATION
We present a generic test case generation algorithm used in
our experiments. To avoid “gaming against criteria”, our test
case generation does not use test metrics as targets, which is
recommended by Chilensky and Miller in their seminal work
[11]. Given a LSTM network and a specified test metric, a
test suite is generated: the coverage result and the number
of adversarial examples out of the test suite are used to
evaluate the robustness of the LSTM network under test. The
effectiveness of our test generation algorithm is later justified
by experiments in Section VIII.
The test generation in Algorithm 1 starts from a set of
seed inputs T0, and the function m is a pre-defined mutation
function. Initially, the test suite T contains only inputs from
T0 (Line 1). A dictionary orig is defined (Line 2) to map every
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test case/mutant generated to its original input in T0, and every
seed input from T0 is mapped to itself (Line 3).
As long as the coverage condition, such as 100% neuron
coverage, is not satisfied (Line 4), the test generation loop
iterates. At each iteration, a test case x is sampled from the
present T (Line 5) and it is mutated using m to have a
new input x′ (Line 6). To guarantee the quality of test cases
generated, x′ is only added into the test suite T if it falls
within the norm ball with respect to its original seed input
(Lines 7 − 9). Finally, the generated test suite T is returned
(Line 10).
Algorithm 1: A Generic Test Case Generation Algorithm
Input: N : DNN to be tested
T0: a set of seed inputs
m: a mutation function
Output: T : a set of test cases
1 T = T0
2 orig ← dict()
3 orig[x]← x for all x ∈ T0
4 while coverage condition is not satisfied do
5 x← to sample an element in T
6 x′ ← m(x)
7 if ||orig(x)− x′||2 ≤ pre-defined distance b then
8 T ← T ∪ {x′}
9 orig[x′]← orig[x]
10 return T
The test case generation in Algorithm 1 is indeed very
generic and the core part is defining the mutation function m.
In the following, we introduce the mutation operations used
in this paper.
a) Gradient-Based Mutation: For the models where the
gradient of the network loss function with respect to the input
is obtainable (for continuous inputs such as images), we can
utilise Algorithm 1 to search the input space along the gradient
direction. Let J(f, x, y) be a cost function over the model f ,
with input x, and output y, and z ⊆ ⋃kNk be a set of variables
(hidden or not). We can define gradient as
grad(x) = ∇zJ(f, x, y) (8)
to denote the gradient of the loss J(f, x, y) with respect to
z. Normally, we take z to be Nk for some layer Lk. For
example, ∇NkJ(f, x, y) represents the usual gradient over the
input dimensions. Finally, we let
m(x) = f t(x)
f t(x) = f t−1(x) +  ∗ sgn(grad(f t−1(x)))
where f0(x) = x. That is, the gradient based mutation takes
two parameters  and t.
b) Random Mutations: For models where the gradient
of the cost function is not obtainable (having discrete inputs
such as words), we define a set M of mutation functions that
randomly mutate an input. At each step of the test generation,
m is instantiated by one function inM. Given different kinds
Fig. 5. Test Framework
of input data, the randomisation operations allowed may also
differ. Our mutation operations used in the experiment are
detailed in Section VIII-B.
VII. TEST FRAMEWORK
Figure 5 presents the overall architecture of our test frame-
work for LSTMs. Given the LSTM network N , a training
dataset X , an oracle O (Section V), the test metric MN
(Section IV), and a mutation method m (Section VI), it first
selects a set of seed inputs, and then the test case generation
method in Algorithm 1 is applied to generate a test suite.
The test generation terminates when certain level of coverage
rate has been satisfied or certain number of test cases have
been generated. We can then evaluate T : (1) by considering
oracle, we obtain the information about adversarial example;
(2) by considering test metric, we obtain the coverage rate.
Practically, the adversarial example can be used for data-
augmentation. Given that this is a method well explored in
other works such as [39], we did not pursue this direction in
the paper. The coverage rate is used to determine if the test
suite T is adequately tested.
VIII. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
This section presents our experimental results on several
typical LSTM networks. We evaluate the effectiveness of
coverage-guided LSTM testing using adversarial examples
as a proxy, we compare different metrics and show their
complementary in guiding test case generation, and we utilise
the generated test cases to access and understand the the LSTM
internal mechanism. All the experiments are run on a CPU
sever with Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2603 v4 @ 1.70 GHz,
64 GB Memory.
A. LSTM Models
In the experiments, we consider the use of LSTM networks
in different domains, including a network trained on MNIST
dataset for image classification, a network trained on an IMDB
review dataset for sentiment analysis, and a network trained
on a Lipophilicity dataset for molecular machine learning.
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a) MNIST Handwritten Digits Analysis by LSTM: The
MNIST database, containing a set of 60,000 grey-scale images
of size 28×28, is used to train a HNN model with 4 layers.
Figure 6 depicts its structure. The first two layers are LSTM
layers, which are correspondingly connected and fed with rows
of input images. That is, each input image is encoded as
the row vector of shape (28,128) by the first LSTM layer,
and then second layer will do further processing to output
a image vector representing the whole image. Finally, two
fully-connected layers with ReLU and SoftMax activation
functions respectively, are used to process the extracted feature
information to get the classification result. The model achieves
99.2% accuracy in training dataset (50,000 samples) and
98.7% accuracy in the default MNIST test dataset (10,000
samples).
Fig. 6. An illustration of an LSTM network trained on MNIST database.
b) Sentiment Analysis by LSTM: The sentiment analy-
sis network [1] has three layers, i.e., an embedding layer,
an LSTM layer, and a fully-connected layer, with 213,301
trainable parameters. The embedding layer takes as input a
vector of length 500 and outputs a 500×32 matrix, which is
then fed into the LSTM layer. Subsequently, there is a fully-
connected layer of 100 neurons.
c) Lipophilicity Analysis by LSTM: We trained an LSTM
network from a Lipophilicity dataset downloaded from the
MoleculeNet [46]. The model has four layers: an embedding
layer, an LSTM layer, a dropout layer, and a fully connected
layer. The input is a SMILES string (Figure 8) representing
a molecular structure and the output is its prediction of
Lipophilicity. A dictionary is used to map the symbols in the
SMILES string to integers. We use the length of the longest
SMILES in training dataset as the number of cells for the
LSTM layer. Similar to text processing in the IMDB model,
short SMILES inputs are padded with 0s to the left side. We
use the root mean square error (RMSE) as the measurement of
model accuracy. Our model is trained up to RMSE = 0.2371
in training dataset and RMSE = 0.6278 in test dataset, which
are better than the traditional and convolutional methods used
in [46].
B. Experimental Setting
a) Symbolic Representation based on Empirical Distribu-
tion: As discussed in Section IV, the symbolic representation
for a time series is obtained by sampling a number of data and
splitting the area under the curve of the empirical distribution,
so that each sub-area is associated with a symbol. In a general
way, the memory data follow the normal distribution. we do a
statistics on three experimental models and find that abstract
information from LSTM layer conform to the hypothesis.
Figure 7 plot the statistical distribution of the positive informa-
tion ξ+ and negative information ξ−, for Sentiment Analysis
networks. We can see that, all the empirical distributions
largely follow the Gaussian distribution (red curves), as shown
in Figure 4.
Fig. 7. Statistical distribution of positive and negative information in LSTM
sequence [480-484], 2,000 test cases for Sentiment Analysis model are
considered.
b) Selection of Mutation Operations: We use Algo-
rithm 1 to generate test cases. We detail the mutation opera-
tions used for different models. For MNIST model, because the
input vector space is continuous, we are able to apply gradient-
based mutation, in particular, by configuring  ∈ (0.05, 0.1]
and t ∈ {1..5}.
Different from the MNIST model where a small change to
its input image is still a valid image, the input to IMDB model
is a sequence of words, on which a small change may lead to
an unrecognisable (and invalid) text paragraph. Based on this
observation, a gradient-based method is not useful and we
take a random-based mutation approach. This is implemented
uding the EDA toolkit [43], which was originally designed
to augment the training data for improvement on text classi-
fication tasks. In our experiments, we consider four mutation
operations, i.e., M includes (1) Synonym Replacement, (2)
Random Insertion, (3) Random Swap, (4) Random Deletion.
The text meanings are reserved in all mutations.
Fig. 8. The same molecular structure represented by different SMILES strings
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For Lipophilicity model, we consider a set M of muta-
tions which change the SMILES string without affecting the
molecular structure it represents. The enumeration of possible
SMILES for a molecule relies on python cheminformatics
package RDkit [35]. with the utilization of RDkit, each input
SMILES string is converted into molfile format, and then atom
order will be changed randomly before converting back. As
shown in Figure 8, several SMILES strings can represent the
same molecular structure. The enumerated SMILES will be
test cases to check if the model really learns the prediction
from molecular structure to the lipophilicity logD value, but
not just the syntax like SMILES representation.
c) Oracle Setting: In our experiments, we set different
radius of the test oracle depending on the models. For con-
tinuous input problems like MNIST, it’s easy to calculate the
distance between input images, and we do the experiments
(except for those in Section VIII-C5) with αoracle = 0.005.
For sentiment analysis, it’s ambiguous to quantify the text
meanings. However, our mutations only apply small perturba-
tions to the original text, with the constraint that the sentiment
does not change. The case for Lipophilicity model is similar,
we use enumeration approach to generate variational SMILES
string of the same molecule, such that obtained SMILES
strings have the same molecular structure as the original string.
C. Effectiveness in Testing
In this part, we show the effectiveness of our coverage-
guided LSTM testing from the following aspects: (1) the
test case generation is efficient, (2) the test suite generated
achieved high coverage that is non-trivial, and (3) there is a
significant percentage of adversarial examples in the test suite.
All experimental results are averaged over 5 runs with different
random seeds.
1) Coverage Improvement by Generated Test Cases: At
first, we compare the coverage results by sampling the 500
inputs from training dataset and by generating 2,000 test cases
generated from these samples using Algorithm 1. The Table I,
shows the results. We can see that, the coverage level is
significantly improved with the test suite generated, and this
comes with a a non-trivial percentage of adversarial examples.
2) Neuron Coverage is Easy to Cover: In our experiments
we found that neuron coverage can be trivially achieve. For
the MNIST model, on average 35 generated test cases are
sufficient to cover all the test conditions. For the IMDB model,
it takes 7 test cases on average to reach 100% neuron cover-
age, and only 20 test cases are needed for the Lipophilicity
prediction model. The detailed running results are shown in
Figure 9. This shows that neuron coverage is not a suitable
metric for RNNs, which also justifies the necessity of our new
metrics for LSTM networks.
3) Gate Coverage and Cell Coverage: Coverage threshold
is a hyper-parameter which needs to be set before the start of
testing process. It is interesting to understand how the setting
of threshold affects the testing result. In our experiments, for
both cell and gate coverage, we sample 1000 test cases and
use averaged gate value ft and averaged aggregate information
Fig. 9. The updating process of Neuron Coverage in 50 test cases.
change value ∆ξt as the median threshold values, and then
gradually decrease and increase them to get a set of experi-
mental settings.
a) MNIST Model: we set thresholds αξ ∈ {3, 6, 9}, αf ∈
{0.71, 0.78, 0.85} and test the LSTM-2 layer. Since MNIST
model has 28 cells in LSTM layer, the total amount of test
conditions to cover is 28 for both cell and gate coverage.
b) Sentiment Analysis Model: The number of LSTM
cells is 500. Thus, there are 500 test conditions for both cell
and gate metrics. The threshold values are set as αξ ∈ {5, 7, 9}
and αf ∈ {0.73, 0.75, 0.77}.
c) Lipophilicity Prediction Model: We have αξ ∈
{5, 6, 7} and αf ∈ {0.75, 0.77, 0.79}. There are 80 cells in
LSTM layer, which means 80 test conditions to be asserted
for each metric.
With the addition of mutated samples into our test suite,
coverage rate will gradually increase. However, it is common
to see that coverage rate may be difficult to improve after
reaching a certain level. That is because the remaining test
conditions in our coverage metrics can only be asserted by
corner cases which are hard to be tested. In our experiments,
we record the updating process in 2000 mutants. The plots are
shown in Figure 10.
The first impression of coverage updating results is that
small value of threshold is less effective in finding adversarial
examples. E.g. when we set αξ = 3 for MNIST, 40 test
cases can meet all test conditions. Since test metrics guide the
algorithm to terminate, and weak test conditions are easier to
be satisfied, less number of test cases are explored. In contrast,
if the threshold is assigned with higher value, coverage rate
may stay in a relatively low level and be hard to be improved.
More test cases are considered, including the corner cases we
want to test. Nevertheless, the time consumption will raise for
the same goal of coverage rate. And it’s very likely that some
test conditions may be too strict to meet.
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TABLE I
CELL, GATE & SEQUENCE COVERAGE FOR LSTM MODEL TRAINED ON THREE DIFFERENT DATASET
Test Model Test Cases # of Adv.Examples
Average Perturbations
(L2 norm)
Running Time
(in seconds)
Coverage
Threshold
Coverage Rate
Cell Forget Gate Positive Sequence Negative Sequence
MNIST 500 0 0 555 αh = 6, αf = 0.78symbols{a, b}
0.75 0.77 0.72 0.66
2,000 592 1.99 4,168 0.89 0.89 0.86 0.84
Sentiment Analysis 500 0 0 726 αh = 7, αf = 0.73symbols{a, b}
0.68 0.65 0.91 0.94
2,000 82 0.11 4,124 0.90 0.91 0.94 0.94
Lipophilicity prediction 500 0 0 236 αh = 5, αf = 0.75symbols{a, b}
0.80 0.88 0.94 0.91
2,000 779 0 949 1.0 0.99 0.94 0.94
Fig. 10. Illustration of Cell, Gate & Sequence Coverage updating in 2000 test cases For MNIST (28 Cells, Seq. in [19-23], Sentiment Analysis (500 Cells,
Seq. in [480-484]) and Lipophilicity Prediction (80 Cells, Seq. in [70,74])
We list experiment results for certain thresholds and com-
pare the results between original seeds input and mutants
in Table I. It shows that our mutation-based test generation
has the following advantages. First, a significant amount of
adversarial examples are found. As stated in Section VIII-A,
the three LSTM models have high levels of accuracy in
training dataset. The mutation method enable us to search for
the misclassified points very close to the training data points.
These adversarial data points can be utilized to retrain the
model for better robustness. Second, the mutants are in favor of
raising coverage rate of a test set. Although there isn’t a strong
relationship between coverage rate and adversarial examples,
the higher coverage rate in a test set with certain amount of
adversarial examples give us more confidence to find various
kinds of adversarial examples induced by different root causes.
4) Sequence Coverage: Sequence coverage is more com-
plicated than cell and gate coverages, because the number of
sequence patterns is exponential with respect to the sequence
length. For example, if we test the whole hidden information
sequence ξ in MNIST model with 2 symbols {a, b}, There are
228 different patterns to be added as test conditions. Moreover,
as discussed earlier, it is likely that a certain portion of patterns
are unable to be asserted. The information update inside LSTM
is a progressive process which means some hugely-fluctuated
patterns are in practice hard to occur in our experiment. In
order to simplify the problem and provide a more customized
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options, the testing range of LSTM sequence is decided by the
users, as the test conditions R[a,b]SC as given in Equation (6).
In our experiments, we focus on the coverage of sequence
patterns at intermediate cells, i.e., [a, b] = [19, 23] for MNSIT,
[a, b] = [480, 484] for Sentiment Analysis, and [a, b] = [70, 74]
for Lipophilicity Prediction.
Our experiments exercise the sequence coverage using 2 and
3 symbols for each model, i.e., Γ = {a, b} and Γ = {a, b, c},
to represent the sequence data and test the sequential pattern
respectively. So the total test conditions to be asserted for 2
symbols are 25 = 32 and for 3 symbols 35 = 243.
The experiment results in Table I and Figure 10 indicates
that sequence coverage is a rigorous test requirement. Al-
though we try to cover sequence information inside 5 cells,
thousands of test cases are generated. 2 symbols representation
shows a good coverage result within 2000 test cases. However,
for 3 alphabetic symbols representation, very few sequence
patterns are found in consideration of the same test cases. It
is expected that if we use more symbols to get more precise
representation, coverage rate will be further reduced even with
more test cases. On the other hand, this reveals the complexity
of LSTM memory. If the sequence coverage is to test the
memory of RNNs, sophisticated memory storing mechanism
makes the network flexible to make predictions for a large
variety of sequential tasks.
5) The Impact of Oracle on Adversarial examples: In the
above experiments, we fix the oracle radius. However, it
is interesting to understand how the setting of oracle, for
example the radius, may affect the quantity and quality of
the test cases and adversarial examples. Here, we focus on
MNSIT model to show how adversarial rate and perturba-
tions on adversarial examples vary with different values of
oracle radius. To give more clear comparison, we apply large
fluctuations on input images. The hyper-parameter is set with
t ∈ {1..5},  ∈ (0.05, 0.3], and the range of oracle value is
αoracle = [0, 0.01]. The experiment results are averaged over
5 different sets of seed inputs. For each set of seeds, 2000 test
cases are generated.
As can be seen in Figure 11, the quantity and the per-
turbations of adversarial examples both increase with the
growth of oracle radius. The large oracle radius reveals the
weak restrictions imposed on filtering adversarial examples.
What‘s more, it is significant to see that adversarial rate in
Fig. 11. The number and the average perturbations of adversarial examples
against the value of oracle radius
Fig. 12. An illustration of adversarial examples’ quality at different oracle
radius for MNIST model
the test set goes linearly with oracle radius in an intermediate
interval. The average perturbations of adversarial examples are
different cases, which show the polynomial relationship with
oracle radius. Both figures give the intuitive explanation on
how robust the model is. The steeper curve, to some extent,
indicates the worse robustness of LSTM to the adversarial
examples.
We also plot some adversarial examples for MNSIT in
Figure 12 when experiments are set up with different oracle
radius. It is expected that large oracle radius can tolerate adver-
sarial examples added with more image noise. The handwritten
digit 3 is largely perturbed and even a little indistinguishable
by humans. In contrast, digit 4 is under imperceptible noise
and much more comply with the definition of adversarial
examples.
D. Comparison between Test Metrics
This section explains how test metrics are complementary
in covering different functionality of the LSTM layer. We
consider minimal test suite, in which the removal of any test
case may lead to the reduction of coverage rate. The rationale
of taking minimal test suite is to reduce the overlaps, so that
it is fairer to compare test metrics. Experimental results for
the three models are presented in Table II.
By considering coverage rates in different minimal test sets,
it’s not difficult to find that the diagonal data is always the
largest value in that row and column. E.g., if we derive a
minimal test set, which has a very high coverage rate of cell
values, it’s not necessary to see that other test metrics can
achieve a good or even better coverage results. This indicates
that our designed test metrics have few interactions in terms of
test requirements. Actually, our purpose of developing these
test metrics are totally different. As discussed in definitions,
cell and gate coverage are one-step test condition, which are
developed to test the basic unit of LSTM layer. Nevertheless,
sequence coverage brings us back to the multi-step test condi-
tions. When using sequence coverage as stopping conditions
for testing, we care more about the information processing
progress of the whole LSTM layer.
Another thing should be noticed is that user-specified
threshold values for cell and gate coverage or symbols for se-
quence coverage may affect the comparison results. Although
our test metrics are not tightly correlated with each other,
weak test requirements are too easy to achieve. That means the
minimal test set targeting a test metrics may have relatively
good coverage result of another test metric, if the latter ones
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TABLE II
COMPARISON BETWEEN TEST METRICS IN MINIMAL TEST SET
Model Targeted Test Metrics Threshold / Symbols Minimal Test Set Coverage RateCell Forget Gate Positive Sequence Negative Sequence
MNIST
Cell Coverage 6 21 0.821 0.464 0.219 0.312
Forget Gate Coverage 0.85 12 0.214 0.821 0.125 0.250
Positive Sequence Coverage {a, b} 27 0.357 0.357 0.844 0.344
Negative Sequence Coverage {a, b} 27 0.250 0.429 0.219 0.844
Sentiment Analysis
Cell Coverage 7 263 0.908 0.768 0.875 0.812
Forget Gate Coverage 0.73 262 0.742 0.926 0.875 0.844
Positive Sequence Coverage {a, b} 30 0.108 0.078 0.938 0.844
Negative Sequence Coverage {a, b} 30 0.108 0.078 0.844 0.938
Lipophilicity prediction
Cell Coverage 6 67 0.900 0.812 0.688 0.817
Forget Gate Coverage 0.77 29 0.075 0.950 0.469 0.500
Positive Sequence Coverage {a, b} 30 0.050 0.637 0.938 0.531
Negative Sequence Coverage {a, b} 30 0.075 0.650 0.500 0.938
are weak test conditions. That is reason why in Table II, some
minimal test sets depict the high coverage rate for all test
metrics.
E. Exhibition of Internal Working Mechanism
We show how to use the generated test cases to understand
the LSTM networks. The experiments consider the two models
for MNIST and IMDB datasets and visualise their learning
mechanism inside the LSTM layer. Figure 13 and 14 present
the coverage times for each feature (or test condition). Cover-
age time counts the number of times a test condition is satisfied
in a test suite. For both models, we take a test suite with 2,000
test cases. Coverage time exhibits the difficulty of asserting a
feature.
a) Less Active Features: For MNIST model, the test suite
is obtained by setting thresholds as αξ = 6 and αf = 0.85.
Note that, each test condition is defined with respect to a row
of pixels on the input image. Figure 13 presents two histogram
plots for cell and gate, respectively. From the cell plot (left),
we can see that the first and last few test conditions are not
covered. This is actually expected since we split an MNIST
image into rows such that each row is used at a time step.
For MNIST images, their top and bottom rows are blank, and
therefore the aggregate information change is not significant
enough to be over the threshold. The gate plot (right) use a
relatively large threshold 0.85. Statistically, in the first several
time steps it is hard for the abstract gate value to meet this
strict test condition. A reasonable explanation is that the LSTM
cell in MNIST model will throw away comparatively more
information at the beginning. These unnecessary information
is likely the edges of MNIST images, as mentioned above.
For IMDB model, in Figure 14, the plots on the bottom line
show the coverage times of all 500 test features for cell and
gate coverage, respectively. From the graph, we can see that
no matter which coverage metric is considered, in contrast
to the last 200 cells, the first 300 cells are less active and
obviously “lazy” in trying to be asserted. The reason behind
this is that the input samples are padded or truncated to the
same length. Since we set the review length to 500 words, the
text we used for training and testing maybe too long or too
short. The short reviews are padded in the left side with 0s.
Therefore, it’s reasonable and likely to see in many test cases,
the first few cells are the “dead cells”.
b) Active Features: In the cell plot of Figure 13, we can
see that cells around 7 and 8 are easy to be asserted, which
means that, for many inputs, within this range there are great
changes in hidden outputs. In other words, those cells’ inputs
provide significant information for the classification. In gate
plot, the long term memory ct tends to update lazily at the end
of the time series. This can be seen from the high coverage
times of the memory values over 0.85 at the last few cells.
Fig. 13. 2000 test cases are used to demonstrate the coverage times of 28
features in LSTM 2 layer of MNIST model.
c) Overall Analysis: If we combine cell and gate plots,
the whole working process of LSTM inside the MNIST model
becomes transparent. The sequence input of an image starts
from the top rows to the bottom rows. At the beginning, the
top rows of MNIST images do not contribute to the model
prediction, which can be seen from the fact that they do
not cause significant hidden state changes. These unimportant
information will be gradually thrown away from the long-term
memory. When input rows containing digits are fed to the
LSTM cells, the model will start learning and the short term
memory, represented by the hidden outputs ht, starts to have
strong reactions. The following process will be random due
to the diversity of digits. When approaching the end of the
sequence, which corresponds to the bottom of digit images,
LSTM has already been confident about the final classification
and becomes lazy to update the memory. Overall, MNIST
digits recognition is not a complicated task for the LSTM
model and the top half part of images seems to be enough for
the classification.
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Fig. 14. 2000 test cases are used to demonstrate the coverage times of 500
features in LSTM layer of Sentiment Analysis model.
For IMDB model, each cell plays an important role in
dealing with passed information and even affecting the final
classification. This is based on the observation of results in
Figure 14. We use 2000 reviews, the length of which are all
greater than 50. This is to make sure cells between 450-500
have the real input words but not padded 0s. Then the coverage
times are counted and plotted which is shown at the top line of
Figure 14. Compared with MNIST result in Figure 13, LSTM
cells and gates in sentiment analysis model are randomly
activated. This can further explain that this network doesn’t
have a fixed working pattern like MNIST. For a MNIST input,
image rows from top to the bottom are gradually changed
and combined to get the specific characteristic which can be
recognized as the digits we perceive. However, sensitive words
in a review text may randomly locate and these words are just
model needs to learn for the classification.
IX. RELATED WORK
a) Adversarial Examples for RNN: Adversarial examples
represent the major safety/robustness concern for deep neural
networks. The adversarial example generation has been an
active domain and a large body of research has been conducted
for adversarial attacks for recurrent neural networks on tasks
such as natural language processing [31], [22], [10], [49], [14],
[15], [3] and automated speech recognition [17], [12], [8]. In
this paper, adversarial examples are used as a proxy to evaluate
the effectiveness of the proposed coverage criteria.
b) Testing feedforward neural networks: Most existing
neural network testing methods focus on the feedforward
structure. In [32] the neuron coverage is proposed. Though
neuron coverage is able to guide the detection of adversarial
examples, it is rather easy to construct a trivial test set to
achieve very high neuron coverage level. Several refinements
and extentions of neuron coverage are later developed in [26].
Motivated by the usage of MC/DC coverage metrics in high
criticality software, in [37], a family of MC/DC variants are
adopted for neural networks, which takes into account the
causal relation between features of different layers and closer.
It has been formally proved in [37] that the criteria in [32], [26]
are specially cases of its MC/DC variant for neural networks.
Besides the structural coverage criteria mentioned above,
metrics in [44], [4], [9] define a set of test conditions to
partition the input space. Though not being a coverage metric,
the method in [25] measures difference measures the differ-
ence between training dataset and test dataset based on neural
network structural information.
Guided by the coverage metrics, test cases can be gener-
ated by neural network testing techniques based on such as
heuristic search [48], fuzzing [20], [30], mutation [27], [41]
and symbolic encoding [38], [18]. None of the mentioned test
generation algorithms has considered RNNs.
c) Testing RNNs: As far as we know, [13] is the only
paper so far that provides coverage metrics for RNNs, in which
at first an automaton is learned to abstract the RNN under test
and then test cases are generated for this automaton. There are
major differences between our work and [13]: (1) the approach
in [13] treats the RNNs as a black-boxes, whereas our coverage
criteria explicitly consider the RNN internal structure; and (2)
the metrics in [13] are based on the abstract automaton, instead
we define test conditions directly upon the neural network.
d) Visualisation for LSTM: For LSTMs, a sequence of
input xt or hidden state ht is a sequence of vectors. To get
an overview of information inside RNN cells, dimensionality
reduction methods (e.g. PCA and t-SNE) have been adopted.
For example, [34] employs PCA to extract the most important
feature of hidden state at each time step. These methods
facilitate the visualisation of RNN hidden behaviors. Our
visualisation is completely different, and works by visualising
the working principles based on a set of test cases.
X. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we develop a test framework for the verifica-
tion and validation of recurrent neural networks, more specif-
ically networks with LSTM layers. The framework includes a
few test metrics to exploit the internal structures of LSTM cells
and a test case generation method. Our experimental results
show the effectiveness of the test framework in working with
a few LSTM networks on different application tasks.
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